This paper employs a novel data set on lobbying expenditures to measure the degree of political organization within sectors and to explore the determinants of the mode of lobbying and political organization across US industries. The data show that sectors characterized by a higher degree of competition (more substitutable products, and a lower concentration of production) tend to lobby more together (through a sector-wide trade association), while sectors with higher concentration and more di¤erentiated products lobby more individually. The paper proposes a theoretical model to interpret the empirical evidence. In an oligopolistic market, …rms can bene…t from an increase in their product-speci…c protection measure, if they can raise prices and pro…ts. They …nd it less pro…table to do so in a competitive market where attempts to raise prices are more likely to reduce pro…ts. In competitive markets …rms are therefore more likely to lobby together thereby simultaneously raising tari¤s on all products in the sector. JEL Classi…cation codes: F13, L13, D7, H0.
Introduction
The in ‡uence of interest groups on policy making is under constant scrutiny. Reforms like the recent Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 in the US are partially a response to the perceived need for transparency and understanding of the activity of these groups and their lobbyists. Much public discussion and academic research alike revolve around the questions of whether lobbies a¤ect legislation and how they accomplish such goal. A key aspect of this process is to comprehend how interest groups organize for the purpose of in ‡uencing the government and what characteristics facilitate the path to political organization. This paper has three goals. The …rst is to use an almost untouched data source on lobbying expenditures to document the degree to which industrial sectors are politically organized for the purpose of lobbying (in particular for trade policy). The data show that sectors vary widely in the extent to which …rms lobby jointly or individually. The second goal is to show empirically what characteristics of sectors seem to favor political organization. We …nd that sectors that exhibit higher levels of product market competition tend to lobby jointly, that is through a sector-wide trade association. The third goal is to propose a theoretical model that rationalizes why product market competition may lead to political organization. Although the model is developed for the case of trade policy we believe its insight can be applied more broadly to understand the determinants of collective versus individual lobbying.
Our point of departure is the literature on special interest politics which, in particular with regard to trade policy, focuses largely on the interaction between a set of interest groups representing sectors and the government. Interest groups are treated as unitary in many of the fundamental contributions in this literature, from the political support function approach in Hillman (1982) , Hillman (1989) and the political competition approach as in Magee et al. (1989) to the approach proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994) in "Protection for Sale". The focus of these papers is to understand how the equilibrium trade policy is shaped, starting from the premise that …rms in an industry or in general individuals with interests in a given industry are or not politically organized.
This aspect has been raised by a number of papers, among which Mitra (1999) , Hillman et al. (2001) and Pecorino (2001) that aim at endogenizing political organization. In the same spirit, Bombardini (2008) proposes a microfoundation of the decision of …rms to participate in political activity. 1 1 The paper shows that the distribution of …rms in the sector a¤ects the equilibrium share of participation in political activity and an empirical speci…cation based on this theory adds explanatory power to the Grossman and Helpman (1994) Almost any attempt to analyze the interaction among …rms within a sector has to deal with the collective action problem (…rst described by Olson (1965) ) of lobbying for an object, trade policy, that bene…ts all …rms in the sector. This is a standard problem of private provision of a public good, like in Bergstrom et al. (1986) , as analyzed by Gawande (1997) in the speci…c case of tari¤ protection.
This paper aims at expanding our understanding of the organization of interest groups by …rst providing an empirical measure of political organization for the purpose of lobbying for trade policy. We exploit a data base of lobbying expenditures in the US made available by the Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995. This data set presents several advantages relative to the one employed by a large number of papers like Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) and Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , that test the predictions of the Protection for Sale model. Those papers make use of campaign contributions to classify sectors into politically organized or not. The advantage of employing lobbying expenditures is that we know the issues targeted by lobbyists. Therefore we can isolate the amount of lobbying expenditures by each sector with the objective of lobbying for trade policy.
The second advantage is that lobbying expenditures is where most of the action seems to be.
They are at least ten times larger than campaign contributions. With a few exceptions, such as Ansolabehere et al. (2002) and de Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) , these data have not been used and, to the best of our knowledge, the one we propose is a novel method to measure the degree of political organization. We show that sectors vary widely in the amount of lobbying expenditures made by trade associations as opposed to individual …rms. In some sectors …rms tend to lobby individually, while in other sectors …rms tend to lobby jointly through a trade association.
The second contribution of the paper is to explore characteristics that are related to the mode of lobbying. The empirical analysis shows that more competitive sectors lobby to a greater degree through a trade association. In particular we …nd that a higher elasticity of substitution among goods, a lower concentration and a larger capital to labor ratio are associated with a larger percentage of total lobbying expenditures made through trade associations.
The third contribution of the paper is to propose a theoretical framework that incorporates the basic features of the data and rationalizes the results found. We model a game among oligopolists where the goods produced are imperfect substitutes. We hypothesize that there is a domestic and a foreign producer for each good. Domestic producers have the option of lobbying for a tari¤ on the entire sector or for a tari¤ on the speci…c good that they produce. When they lobby jointly through a trade association they perceive their lobbying e¤orts to be bene…tting other …rms. Hence one of the features of the model is sub-optimal lobbying in the trade association. This mechanism alone would induce …rms to lobby for their product-speci…c tari¤. Nevertheless, the imperfectly competitive nature of the sector creates a motive for …rms to lobby together. Consider an attempt of one …rm to lobby for an increase in its individual tari¤. This increase in tari¤ translates into an increase in price and in pro…ts only if consumers cannot substitute away from the good. If the product is very substitutable with other domestic varieties or if there are many other varieties available (a large number of …rms and therefore a low concentration) then the …rm prefers all tari¤s to be raised at the same time, which is accomplished with lobbying by the trade association. The model explains why high substitutability delivers a higher share of joint lobbying in an unambiguous way. The e¤ect of concentration is less straightforward because there is another e¤ect going in the opposite direction, caused by the standard free-rider problem emphasized by Olson (1965) , Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Gawande (1997) . The free-rider problem is generally thought to worsen as the industry gets less concentrated. This e¤ect is present in this model and tends to make an industry that is less concentrated less likely to lobby through a trade association. Whether the free-rider e¤ect prevails or not depends on the parameters of the problem, as we discuss in the theoretical section of the paper.
The idea that lower concentration in the product market might deliver more cooperation in lobbying for protection is already present in a paper by Pecorino (2001) , who develops a model where …rms in the sector face a collective action problem. There is an e¢ cient level of protection, that maximizes the joint surplus of all …rms in the sector, but the non-cooperative equilibrium entails a sub-optimal level of tari¤s because of free riding. The paper builds an in…nitely repeated game where the cooperative equilibrium, with the optimal level of protection, is supported by the threat of reverting to the non-cooperative equilibrium if a …rm deviates. Pecorino shows that, because a higher number of …rms causes the level of tari¤s in the non-cooperative equilibrium to be lower, a less concentrated sector might …nd it easier to enforce the cooperative equilibrium.
This result is in line with what we …nd in the data and is related to the theoretical result we …nd, although the models and mechanisms are di¤erent. Moreover it is not obvious how to justify the e¤ect of the elasticity of substitution on political organization in the framework proposed by Pecorino.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the e¤ect of competition on the equilibrium mode of lobbying. Section 5 concludes.
Prima facie empirical evidence on the mode of lobbying
The objective of this section is to investigate the relationship between the extent of trade association lobbying and product market competition. We are interested in showing how the substitutability of goods within an industry and the degree of concentration within an industry a¤ect the mode of lobbying and with what results for collective action.
To the best of our knowledge the evidence for an extensive number of sectors in the US economy is lacking. We …nd this an interesting empirical question as the basic theoretical intuition for the relationship between exogenous structural/technological characteristics of a market (its industrial organization) and the incentives towards political organization is a priori ambiguous.
On the one hand, it seems reasonable to think of product market competition as a force towards political disintegration through strong incentives to undercut competitors and free ride. On the other hand, a high degree of product market competition may create higher payo¤s from organized lobbying, induce stronger incentives towards political organization, and reduce costs of supporting homogenous policies for the sector.
The data
We now describe the data employed in the empirical section. A contribution of this paper is to assemble a large data set of lobbying expenditures for trade policy, the …rst one available in the trade literature to the best of our knowledge. The Lobby Disclosure Act (1995) and, more recently, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (2007) impose strict disclosure rules for every individual and …rm lobbying government. 2 The LDA imposes disclosure requirement for lobbyists, which have to …le registration and regular six-month reports indicating not only the amounts received by companies as compensation for their services, but also issues (among them international trade) and government agencies lobbied. 3 Although substantial attention has been paid in the literature on trade policy and special interests to political contributions data, lobbying expenditures have not received substantial attention, mostly because of scarce availability and sparse access to the original source …les. Lobbying expenditures are however particularly apt to the study of in ‡uence in politics, and particularly international trade, for several reasons. First, lobbyists must indicate the issue they are lobbying for 2 The LDAde…nes a lobbyist: "Any individual (1) who is either employed or retained by a client for …nancial or other compensation (2) whose services include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services on behalf of that client during any three month period. Out of the 3; 466 unique client entries we were able to successfully identify and match to speci…c SIC codes 3; 448 of them, for a total of 111; 156 unique registrant-client-year-issue entries. 4 We then collapsed the data at the sector level, to obtain total lobbying expenditures, and lobbying expenditure by type of client (individual …rm or trade association, both foreign and domestic) from which we construct IndF rac i ; the share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual …rms in industry i: Particularly, the share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual …rms as opposed to trade associations is a very accurate measure of the strength of collective action within a sector in the sense of Olson (1965) .
We collected the sectorial characteristics data from a variety of sources. From the National Bureau of Economic Research Industrial Database we obtain the total employment and physical capital stock measures employed to compute the capital/labor ratios at the sectorial level (averaged over the 1986-96 period). From the same source we also obtain total shipments. We obtain elasticities of substitution, Elast i ; from Broda and Weinstein (2006) , which we use in their original format and we also discretized in three tercile-speci…c dummies (low, medium and high elasticity of substitution) in order to partially control for measurement error in the estimates. We also follow the literature (Goldberg and Maggi (1999) ) in not allowing correction in the empirical analysis for the fact that the variable is estimated. Conc i is our preferred measure of concentration (share of output produced by largest 4 …rms), number of establishments, and total shipments are available from the 1997 Economic Census (Release Date: 12/17/2002). The controls for geographic and political concentration are obtained from Busch and Reinhardt (1999) . These controls are particularly apt for our study, since they not only measure geographic concentration, but also distinguish between industries whose activities are geographically clustered from industries whose clusters also fall within the same political district (and hence potentially have more political clout). The data on the number of tari¤ lines per harmonized system code at the 8 and 10 digit are from Feenstra et al.
(2002).
We report summary statistics in Table 1 . Concerning our main variable of interest IndF rac i , one can notice by considering mean and median of the fraction of lobbying done at the individual level is that a good fraction of sectors only experiences individual lobbying. Indeed, the density of IndF rac i is bimodal. The fraction of sectors with a fraction above 90 percent of total lobbying done at the trade association level roughly varies between 15 and 20 percent depending on the set of available covariates (the table reports summary statistics for the smallest sample for which all covariates are available, corresponding to speci…cation (6) in Table 2 ). The fraction of sectors with a fraction above 90 percent of lobbying done at the individual level roughly varies between 40 and 55 percent. 
Empirical evidence
Let us de…ne the following variables for i indicating a 4-digit Standard Industrial Classi…cation sector: IndF rac i share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual …rms in sector i; Elast i elasticity of substitution or dummy for low, medium and high elasticity of substitution (from Broda and Weinstein, 2006); Conc i is measure of concentration (share of output produced by largest 4 …rms);
is capital to labor ratio in sector i: The speci…cation that we estimate is:
where the control set is indicated by X i .
The nature of the dependent variable is such that censoring occurs naturally over the unit interval. For this is the reason we estimate (1) using a Tobit two-sided censoring in all speci…cations.
All the standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.
In Table 2 we report estimates of the reduce-form speci…cation (1) We begin by imposing 2 = 0 in order to study the simple correlation of elasticity of substitution and mode of lobbying. Column (1) of Table 2 reports the estimates of the relationship between the share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual …rms in industry i; IndF rac i ; and dummies variables for medium and low elasticity of substitution in the sector (leaving low elasticity as contrast group). From a quantitative standpoints the e¤ects are sizable. Using the marginal e¤ects on the latent variable (upper panel of Table 2 ) column (1) shows that going from high/medium to low elasticity produces an increase in the fraction of lobbying done at …rm level increases by 28:2%. Starting from the mean elasticity of substitution a decrease by one standard deviation in the elasticity produces an increment of IndF rac of about 3%. Using the marginal e¤ects (lower panel of Table 2 ) column (1) shows that going from high/medium to low elasticity produces an increase in the fraction of lobbying done at …rm level increases by 5:5%. Starting from the mean elasticity of substitution a decrease by one standard deviation in the elasticity produces an increment of
IndF rac of about 0:6%. The estimates are smaller in the lower panel has they are rescaled for the probability of IndF rac falling in the unit interval. In column (2) we re-estimate (1) with the restriction 2 = 0 but using a continuous variable for elasticity of substitution with similar results.
There is also widespread evidence of a positive degree of correlation between standard product market concentration measures (Conc i ) and the share of total lobbying expenditure done by individual …rms in industry. We employ the fraction of total shipments covered by the top four …rms , the capital/labor ratio (as proxy for entry barriers in the sector) and average …rm size in the industry. Columns (3)- (5) report a statistically signi…cant degree of positive correlation between concentration and political dispersion (i.e. lack of predominantly association-based lobbying) when
We then include all product market competition proxies (both Elast i and Conc i ) in the …nal columns of Table 2 , in columns (6) and (7) where we employ dummy variables and continuous variables for the elasticity of substitution. Both higher elasticity of substitution parameters and lower capital intensity of the sector strongly predict higher lobbying through trade associations, as opposed to individual lobbying. F-tests, not reported, strongly reject the null of no explanatory power for our set of measures of competition. In the …nal two columns of Table 2 we also report the reduced-form correlations between all the measures of competitions and the total amount of resources spent in lobbying in the sector. Interestingly the e¤ects of higher elasticity of substitution parameters and lower capital intensity of the sector strongly predict lower levels lobbying, suggesting that the same sectors where lobbying goes through trade associations also undertake less lobbying.
In Table ( 3) we introduce a set of controls to speci…cation (1) for robustness. In the speci…cation we include two Her…ndhal indexes for political and geographic concentration; the logarithm of total shipments in the sector; the number of HS8 tari¤ lines; a SIC level-1 …xed e¤ect covering the 2000-groups of manufacturing industries. 5 Although limited, this set of covariates captures a wide spectrum of systematic determinants of lobbying e¤orts across-sectors. In particular, the omission of sector size or its geographic dispersion could be well biasing the estimates in Table 2 . A very reassuring feature of Table 3 is the increase in the size of the estimated marginal e¤ects when the set of controls is added. Given the relative exogeneity of the technological and structural sectorial characteristics approximating for product market competition, the omission of relevant variables correlated with competition seems to be the main potential confounding factor in interpreting 1 and 2 : However, a clear indication of the potential relevance of omitted variables would be the presence of substantial drops in the size of 1 and 2 whenever alternative controls were added, as this would indicate that elasticity of substitution and competition were likely capturing variation pertinent to alternative factors. This could likely happen when employing even a small but diverse spectrum of controls such ours. 6 At the opposite, we …nd larger e¤ects, suggesting that omission of variables does not appear to be a …rst order concern for our reduced-form estimates.
3 The model
Set up
Consider an economy with a measure one of consumers, each supplying one unit of labor. Preferences of the representative consumer are described by the following utility function:
where q 0 is consumption of a homogeneous good, chosen as numeraire (with an international and domestic price of one), and Q i is consumption of a variety of di¤erentiated good, with i = 1; :::; N . 7
The parameters of the utility function, and are positive, while 0 1. We assume throughout that the demand for all goods is positive. Given these preferences the demand for each variety i is:
where p i is the price of variety i. For analytical convenience we choose the parameterization proposed by Singh and Vives (1984) , where describes the substitutability among varieties. As increases, demand for variety i becomes more elastic with respect to all prices, but it becomes relatively more elastic with respect to the prices of varieties other than i. For = 0 there is no substitution among varieties, while for = 1 all varieties are perfect substitutes. Another feature of interest is that the elasticity of demand for variety i with respect to other prices is increasing in N . 8 In this sense the number of varieties N a¤ects the substitutability of di¤erentiated goods in a fashion similar to . Demand for the homogeneous good is q 0 = I
, where I is income. 6 We checked the robustness of our speci…cation to a much wider set of controls, including employment, input costs, productivity, etc., with similar results. 7 We follow Ottaviano, Tabushi and Thisse (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in modelling product di¤er-entiation through a quadratic utility function. Like in these papers, the choice is driven by analytical tractability.
8 To show this we can rewrite (2) as Qi =
It is easy to verify that dQ i dp i is increasing in N . Since the level of Qi is decreasing in N at any given level of prices, the elasticity
Under these preferences, indirect utility V takes the form:
The numeraire good is produced under constant returns to scale using one unit of labor per unit of output and supplied by a competitive sector. We assume that the production of the numeraire good is positive, so that the wage is equal to one. The production of di¤erentiated goods is undertaken by domestic and foreign …rms. Each variety Q i is produced by only two …rms: one domestic and one foreign. In this economy therefore each domestic …rm faces the competition of a foreign rival that produces an identical product. All …rms bear a constant marginal cost of units of labor per unit of the di¤erentiated good. On top of the production cost, foreign …rm i can be charged a speci…c tari¤ 9 T + t i , which we discuss below. We assume Bertrand competition among all producers of the di¤erentiated goods. In the presence of positive tari¤s, Bertrand competition among producers of identical goods guarantees that the domestic …rm will choose a limit price
as long as this is below the equilibrium price that would prevail in the absence of foreign competitors. 10 We assume throughout that we are operating at a level of tari¤s such that limit pricing prevails. Imports of di¤erentiated goods are always zero in this model. Substituting the limit price (4) into the quantity equation (2) we …nd pro…ts of domestic …rm i as a function of tari¤s:
Having calculated pro…ts, we can …nd income I by adding up pro…ts across …rms and labor income, which is one because both the population and the wage are equal to one:
There are no tari¤ revenues in this economy because of limit pricing. Replacing (5) in (3), we can express the indirect utility as a function of tari¤s, V (t 1 ; :::; t N ; T ), by substituting the limit price (4) in the resulting expression for V . 9 We follow the literature in focusing on speci…c tari¤s, as ad valorem tari¤s are analytically less tractable. 1 0 In a model with Bertrand competition and di¤erentiated products, the symmetric equilibrium price would be
; 8i:
Producers of di¤erentiated goods not only interact in the product market, but also decide on whether to organize politically to in ‡uence the level of tari¤s, on which their pro…ts depend.
In this economy the government is a unitary agent that has the ability to set tari¤s. 11 The government's objective function includes aggregate welfare as well as services provided by lobbyists which we assume are proportional to the lobbying expenditures made by …rms:
where L is the amount spent on lobbying by the trade association and l is the aggregate amount spent on lobbying by individual …rms.
In Grossman and Helpman (1994) , and the related literature, the government is assumed to care about welfare and political contributions, which are useful to the incumbent politicians because they increase the probability of re-election. In this paper we study lobbying expenditures, which are not directly channeled to the politician, but to lobbyists. According to a large amount of anecdotal evidence lobbyists provide many services to politicians such as producing documents, drafting legislation, providing expert testimony and even organizing campaign events. 12 There are many papers formally analyzing the role of informational lobbying in policy making (Grossman and Helpman (2001) , Potters and Van Winden (1990) , Potters and Winden (1992) and Austen-Smith (1993) ). In this paper we take an approach that is in between these two streams of literature. On the one hand, we move away from the view that interest groups provide just money to politicians in exchange for policies and recognize that lobbyists provide other useful services to politicians such as information. On the other hand, we do not formalize the game in terms of a signalling game, primarily because we would not have a way of directly relate it to the data. Indeed, a drawback of signalling models is that they are very hard to test empirically. For the purpose of this paper we accept that lobbying services describe part of the interaction between politicians and interest groups, but we limit ourselves to a reduced form that links the amount of lobbying activity and the utility of the politicians.
Expression (6) allows the trade-o¤ between the amount of lobbying services and aggregate welfare to depend on the source of lobbying services. This is meant to capture the fact that trade associations might be more or less e¤ective at lobbying the government than individual …rms. We do not provide a microfoundation of the reason why 7 , leaving it to future work to explore the e¤ectiveness of di¤erent modes of lobbying.
Structure of the lobbying game
The structure of the game is sequential. 13 The timing of the game is the following: Stage 2 (Lobbying Alone): given the sector-wide tari¤ negotiated by the trade association T , each …rm i simultaneously makes a take-or-leave o¤er (t i ; l i ) to the government. The government accepts or rejects the o¤ers.
Stage 3: Production and consumption take place
We solve the game backward starting from stage 3. We have already described the interaction among …rms in the product market and we have found the variables that are relevant for the previous stages of the game, pro…ts i (t 1 ; :::; t N ; T ) and aggregate welfare V (t 1 ; :::; t N ; T ).
Lobbying Alone
At stage 2, T has been determined and individual …rms consider whether to lobby to increase the tari¤ on their own product. This means we are limiting the strategy space for each individual …rm i to t i . Throughout we are going to impose that t i 0 and l i 0 (individual …rms cannot "undo"
T and reduce the tari¤ on their own product). At this stage the government problem is to accept or reject the o¤ers made by individual …rms. In particular the government might accept any subset of the o¤ers, so we need to understand whether we can limit the set of equilibrium strategies of the government. Let us denote the set of …rms whose o¤ers are accepted by N A . Thanks to symmetry we can order …rms so that the …rst N A are the ones whose o¤ers are accepted. Then the government problem is the following: 
Lemma 1 In equilibrium all o¤ ers are accepted, i.e. N A = N .
1 3 We have characterized the solution for the simultaneous game as well and, although the tari¤ levels are the same, the equilibrium mode of lobbying depends on parameters in a slightly di¤erent way. Nevertheless the basic results of comparative statics with respect to the degree of substitutability and the number of …rms are the same. Overall, the main di¤erence is that the simultaneous game allows a larger set of parameters where joint lobbying prevails.
Proof. In Appendix.
Let us here provide the intuition for this Lemma, with all the details relegated to the appendix.
Imagine that there is only one …rm, …rm 1, whose o¤er is accepted by the government. Firm 1 asks for tari¤ t and o¤ers l 1 = (V (t; 0; :::; 0; T ) V (0; :::; 0; T )). If …rm 1 …nds this pro…table then …rm 2, identical to …rm 1, will have even higher incentives to ask for the same tari¤ t, since the government will need a lower amount of lobbying expenditures to be compensated. This is because the …rst tari¤ on an individual variety produces a large distortion in relative prices, while the tari¤ on the second product does not distort them as much and so on. This means that if any …rm has incentive to make an o¤er that will be accepted (and for low enough there will always be a tari¤ that is small enough to be worth obtaining), then all …rms will have an incentive to make o¤ers that will be accepted. So the government never …nds accepting only one o¤er to be optimal, if all …rms ask for the same tari¤ t and o¤er no more than l 1 (if one of them did, the government would be strictly better o¤ accepting that o¤er only).
Lemma 1 and the fact that …rms make take-or-leave o¤ers imply that the only constraint …rms have to take into account when choosing (t i ; l i ) is that they must keep the government indi¤erent between free trade and accepting all o¤ers:
l i + V (t 1 ; :::; t N ; T ) = V (0; :::; 0; T )
Clearly the constraint is binding otherwise …rms could decrease the amount of lobbying expenditures without a¤ecting the government's decision and strictly gaining.
Firm i problem is therefore to maximize pro…ts minus lobbying expenditures, taking as given the set of (t j ; l j ) for j 6 = i and subject to constraint (7). Isolating Notice that this implies that the …rm will choose the tari¤ t i that maximizes the joint surplus of the government and the …rm itself, given the tari¤ and lobbying expenditures of all other …rms.
We take the …rst order conditions for all …rms and solve for the Nash equilibrium tari¤ levels and lobbying expenditures. The indeterminacy of lobbying expenditures is a common characteristics of this class of games (such as Grossman and Helpman (1994) ) where the government has an objective function linear in lobbying expenditures and utility of consumers is quasi-linear. In order to proceed to Stage 1 we need to make assumptions that restrict the level of equilibrium lobbying expenditures. The presence of identical …rms suggests the assumption of symmetry in the lobbying expenditures, which we make here.
Assumption 1 -The amount of lobbying expenditure at Stage 2 is identical across …rms: 
Lobbying Together
At stage 1 of the game …rms decide how much to contribute to the lobbying expenditures by the trade association representing the sector. We adopt a very stylized and somewhat mechanical view of the trade association. We see the trade association as a 'technology'that transforms lobbying expenditures into a common tari¤ T at a rate that might be di¤erent from . The timing of the game and the stategy space for the …rms will deliver free-riding in the sense that the level of T achieved is not the cooperative level. This is a desired feature in our view because free-riding is one of the fundamental aspects of the trade o¤ between individual and joint lobbying. This is meant to capture the idea that …rms evaluate whether to contribute to their own tari¤ or to the sector-wide tari¤. While, in some cases, they might prefer all tari¤s to be raised simultaneously, when they contribute a dollar to lobbying expenditures of the trade association, they perceive its return to be spread over all goods and therefore they tend to contribute less. If the trade association achieved the cooperative level of T then there would be no need for …rms to lobby for their individual t i . 
The trade association will lower L until constraint (8) binds for any T otherwise it would bene…t without modifying the government's behavior. From this binding constraint we can derive a function
L i that relates the amount of lobbying expenditures to the level of tari¤ T . Firm i problem is then to …nd the level of L i that maximizes pro…ts net of lobbying expenditures, given the lobbying expenditures by other …rms:
Because of perfect substitutability between t i and T and the presence of symmetry, this problem entails corner solutions. Either all …rms lobby alone (t i > 0 8i and T = 0) or they all lobby together (t i = 0 8i and T > 0). which delivers a unique solution in the tari¤ level:
Notice that this level of tari¤ is privately e¢ cient from the point of view of …rm i because it maximizes the joint surplus of the …rm and the government. This is an extreme level of free-riding, which we could be relaxed, but serves as a stark benchmark, for the reasons discussed above. While the tari¤ level T is uniquely determined, along with the total amount of lobbying expenditure L, the amount of individual lobbying expenditures L i cannot be pinned down. How …rms share L is relevant for the incentives of …rms to deviate from joint lobbying, as described in the sections below.
Let us now consider the case of t i > 0 and then verify when it is an equilibrium for …rms to only lobby alone. If t i > 0 then the overall tari¤ on all goods is . If we substitute t i + T = in the objective function (9), along with the expression for l i and the constraint (8) 
Problem (10) reduces therefore to maximizing over T the expression N V (0; :::; T ). It is easy now to verify that this is a linear problem that delivers corner solutions. Either T is set to 0 or it is increased to a point at which …rms no longer have incentives to lobby individually. If < N then lobbying by the trade association is very e¤ective and t i = 0. If > N then we need to consider other parameters of the problem to determine the equilibrium mode of lobbying and the tari¤ level. In particular we are going to discuss the characterization of the equilibria as function of two parameters considered to describe the level of product market competition in the economy, the degree of substitutability and of concentration, N . Diagram 1 illustrates the equilibrium in Proposition 2 for > 2 . Notice that there exists an such that for < , > T and for , T , but such value of turns out not to be a qualitative threshold for the types of equilibria.
[
DIAGRAM 1 HERE]
Proof. In Appendix Proposition 3 establishes that industries characterized by high substitutability among products are more likely to organize into a trade association, while industries where products are di¤erenti-ated are expected to lobby individually. This is because the more substitutable products are, the lower the increase in pro…t an increase in t i induces, making lobbying for T a better alternative.
The next section analyzes how concentration a¤ects the equilibrium mode of lobbying.
Concentration
This section shows how a higher degree of competition in the form of a larger number of …rms N can lead to lobbying Together as the equilibrium. As opposed to the case of the substitutability parameter, where the relationship between mode of lobbying and product di¤erentiation is not ambiguous, here the number of …rms has two e¤ects on the mode of lobbying. The …rst, which we refer to as Free-Riding E¤ect, has been described in a number of papers about the collective action problem, starting with Olson (1965) . As N increases the free-riding problem in the trade association becomes more severe because each …rm is smaller and internalizes less the bene…ts of an increase in T . This e¤ect makes an industry characterized by a small concentration less likely to lobby jointly. The second, which we refer to as Competition E¤ect, is similar to the one described in the previous section. As the number of …rms N increases, an attempt by one …rm to increase its product-speci…c tari¤ causes a smaller increase in pro…ts. This is not just because the …rm itself is smaller and therefore the increase in pro…ts is smaller, but because as the price of one variety increases consumers can choose among many other varieties. If we take the symmetric case (identical prices p), the shape of the demand function for Q i (2) reveals that as N increases, It is instructive to build some intuition for the result in Proposition 4. The Competition e¤ect can be easily seen graphically by plotting for speci…c values the marginal bene…ts for …rm i of an increase in t i (
) and an increase in T (
A rise in N makes the marginal bene…t of t i decline faster than the marginal bene…t of T . 14 [GRAPH 2 HERE] This e¤ect tends to deliver the result that lobbying Together prevails for large N unless the marginal costs of the two policy instruments move in the opposite way. The marginal cost for T , given by @V @T , is increasing in N very steeply for low values of N and then levels o¤. This is because as N increases the love for variety makes it more expensive to place a tari¤ on a set of goods, the di¤erentiated ones, which are now more valuable. The marginal cost of t i ,
, decreases with N because it protects a smaller share of all goods, as shown in the graph below.
[GRAPH 3 HERE]
A high value of emphasizes the steep section of @V @T making it less desirable for …rms to lobby jointly when N is low. This is clearly not a mechanism that we think is particularly relevant empirically. The Competition E¤ect would be delivered by the shape of the marginal bene…ts alone, which is the part we would like to emphasize.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides a novel measure of the degree of political organization of …rms for the purpose of lobbying for trade policy. The paper documents that more competitive sectors are more likely to organize politically and proposes a theoretical framework to analyze the choice of mode of lobbying that we observe in the data.
One question that we have left unexplored in this paper is whether the mode of lobbying has any e¤ect on policy outcomes, in this case the level of protection. In a related project we …nd that, controlling for the total level of lobbying expenditures, the larger the share of lobbying expenditures by the trade association, the higher the level of protection. This evidence indicates that …rms that manage to lobby jointly through a trade association have a higher return on their lobbying e¤orts.
It is left to future research to explore why trade associations are more e¤ective than individual …rms in obtaining favorable legislation. One possible explanation is based on theories of informational lobbying. If one accepts that the trade association has preferences that are more aligned with the government than individual …rms then the amount of lobbying expenditure required to obtain a certain level of protection is lower. Another possible explanation is that politicians …nd information provided by trade associations lobbyists more useful than that provided by individual …rms. There might be more theories able to explain this …nding and we leave it to future research.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
By contradiction, say only N 0 < N o¤ers are accepted. Without loss of generality let us assume that N 0 = 1 and that the o¤er accepted is by …rm 1. If this is an equilibrium it means that the lobbying expenditure is enough to compensate the government for the loss of welfare,
[V (t 1 ; 0; :::; T ) V (0; 0; :::; T )] and that 1 (t 1 ; 0; :::; T ) l 1 1 (0; 0; :::; T ). In order to prove that …rm 2 will have an incentive to lobby for a tari¤ t 2 t 1 , it is su¢ cient to show that 2 (t 1 ; t 1 ; :::; T ) l 2 2 (t 1 ; 0; :::; T ) with l 2 = [V (t 1 ; t 1 ; :::; T ) V (t 1 ; 0; :::; T )]. We can show that 2 (t 1 ; t 1 ; :::; T ) 2 (t 1 ; 0; :::; T ) + [V (t 1 ; t 1 ; :::; T ) V (t 1 ; 0; :::; T )] > 1 (t 1 ; 0; :::; T )
Proof of Proposition 3
Part 1 of the proposition has already been shown. In order to understand the characterization of the equilibrium for > 2 we need to consider pro…table deviations by the individual …rm as a function of the parameter of interest . In what follows, to shorten notation, we indicate as V (x) the aggregate welfare when the overall tari¤ level on all goods is x.
For part 2, …rst, we need to determine the lowest level of for which lobbying Together is sustainable. The easiest way of supporting joint lobbying is when = 
where T 0 is the tari¤ that the trade association can negotiate with L = 1 2 L. We can show that D 1 ( ) is increasing in 16 , it is negative at = 0 and positive for ! 1 hence it crosses the horizontal axis only once, thus determining the location of . For > staying in the trade association with = 1 2 is an equilibrium. Second, we need to determine the highest level of for which lobbying Alone is sustainable.
That is we start from individual lobbying and consider a deviation in which …rm 1 unilaterally contributes the entire lobbying expenditure of the trade association L (foreseeing that this will eliminate individual lobbying in the second stage). Denote the bene…t from such deviation as
We can show that D 2 ( ) is increasing in , it is negative at = 0 and positive for ! 1 hence it crosses the horizontal axis only once, thus determining the location of . For > lobbying Alone is never an equilibrium.
For part 3, we calculate ( ) as the maximum share of L paid by …rm 1 that makes joint lobbying feasible. That is we …nd that makes …rm 1 indi¤erent between paying its share of L and not paying it, anticipating individual lobbying in stage 2: where T 0 is the tari¤ that the trade association can negotiate with L = (1 ) L. Once an expression for ( ) is found, it is easy to show that it is increasing in . 17 Because of symmetry one can reproduce the argument for the maximum share of L by …rm 2, 1 , that makes joint lobbying feasible and show that this increasing in . This is equivalent to having a decreasing function ( ).
Proof of Proposition 4
Analogously to the proof of proposition 3, we will …nd the lowest value of N for which joint lobbying is an equilibrium and the highest value of N for which individual lobbying is an equilibrium. Starting from joint lobbying and equal share of lobbying expenditures we consider the possibility of …rm 1 deviating at stage 1 and not paying 1 N L (foreseeing that all …rms will increase the level of individual lobbying expenditures at stage 2). Denote the di¤erence in payo¤s between staying in the trade association and deviating as D 3 (N ):
where T 0 is the tari¤ that the trade association can negotiate with L = N 1 N L. We can show that D 3 (N ) crosses the horizontal axis at most once and it is increasing at that point 18 , thus determining the location of N . If is very high then N might be below 2 which indicates that there is no value of N for which lobbying alone is the unique equilibrium mode of lobbying.
In order to …nd the values of N for which lobbying together is the only equilibrium mode of lobbying we start from individual lobbying and consider a deviation in which …rm 1 unilaterally contributes the entire lobbying expenditure of the trade association L (foreseeing that this will eliminate individual lobbying in the second stage). Denote the bene…t from such deviation as
We can show that D 4 (N ) crosses the horizontal axis at most once and is increasing at that point, thus determining the location of N . 19 For N > N lobbying Alone is never an equilibrium. For very low D 4 (N ) never intersects the horizontal axis and therefore there are no values of N for which lobbying together is the unique equilibrium mode of lobbying. Marginal effects on the realized dependent variable in the lower panel. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The omitted group for the elasticity of substitution dummies (SIGMA) is the low percentile (<33%) dummy. Notes: Tobit estimator with robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The omitted group for the elasticity of substitution dummies (SIGMA) is the middle percentile (33%) dummy. Political and Geographic Concentration measures are from Busch and Reinhardt (1999) . Economic SIC 4 level Controls are from BEA and US Census Bureau. 
